30

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Pol 14 VIETS

504

CONFIDENTIAL

45
Action
PE

Info
SS
G
S P
SAH
L
H
SAL
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
AID

RSR

NNNNVV MJA979JIA658
RR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 6637 2651220
ZNY CCCCC
R 221037Z SEP 66
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 6637

SEPTEMBER 22

REF: A. STATE 51208
B. SAIGON 5144

020081

1966 SEP 22 AM 9 10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MP

REVIEWED BY Dawn Igarb DATE 10/5/81

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED ☑ RELEASABLE ☑
RELEASE DENIED ☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

1. DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT FIGURES FOR EACH CONSTITUENCY NOT YET AVAILABLE FROM SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR ADMINISTRATION AND WE HAVE REQUESTED THEM FROM COORDINATORS IN FIELD.

2. WITH REGARD TO QUESTIONS RAISED REF A:

A) IN CENTRAL HIGHLAND PROVINCES (PARA 2, REF A) MONTAGNARDS WERE ENTITLED TO VOTE IN VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS (AS NOTED REF B) AND GENERALLY DID SO. ETHNIC BREAKDOWN OF REGISTERED VOTERS NOT GENERALLY AVAILABLE, BUT IN ONE INSTANCE, KONTUM PROVINCE, WHEN FIRST POSTING OF VOTERS' LISTS TOTALED 38,264 PERSONS, 13,570 OF THOSE WERE ETHNIC VIETNAMESE AND 24,694 WERE MONTAGNARDS. HIGH PERCENTAGE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 6637 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TURNOUT IN SAME REGION ATTRIBUTABLE IN LARGE PART TO CONCENTRATION OF REGISTERED VOTERS IN A FEW SECURE AREAS.

B) WITH REGARD TO TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS THEORETICALLY ELIGIBLE TO VOTE (PARA 3, REF A), DEPT IS CORRECT IN ASSUMING WE USED 15.6 MILLION ESTIMATE OF TOTAL POPULATION DIVIDED BY TWO. PERHAPS MORE PRECISE METHOD IS TO USE 9.3 PERCENT, WHICH IS NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS ESTIMATE FOR PROPORTION OF POPULATION OVER 18. USING 15.6 MILLION TOTAL, THIS WOULD YIELD FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY 7.69 MILLION PERSONS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE. SINCE TOTAL POPULATION IS MERELY A PROJECTION, FIGURE FOR NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE CANNOT BE DETERMINED MORE PRECISELY. WE WILL

DECONTROLLED BY [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

0311357.30

DECLASSIFIED

ATTEMPT, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ESTIMATE OF ELIGIBLE POPULATION IN EACH CONSTITUENCY. AS DEPT NOTES, SEVERAL OF CONSTITUENCIES CITED WHERE VOTING POPULATION APPEARS HIGH HAVE RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE INFLUX OF POPULATION IN LAST TWO YEARS; THESE INCLUDE DA NANG, SAIGON, GIA DINH AND BIEN HOA.

C) LOW PERCENTAGES OF REGISTRATION IN DELTA PROVINCES CITED (PARA 4, REF A) DO REFLECT SECURITY SITUATION. IN

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 6637 C O N F I D E N T I A L
MOST CASES REGISTRATION INCREASED ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER 1965 FIGURES. IN GO CONG, HOWEVER, REGISTRATION ROSE FROM 19,838 IN 1965 TO 33,251 THIS YEAR, AN INCREASE OF 67 PERCENT. SIMILARLY, AN XUYEN REGISTRATION, WHILE STILL LOW IN PROPORTION TO ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATION, WAS HALF AGAIN AS LARGE AS IN 1965. LODGE
BT

DECLASSIFIED

ORIGIN/ACTION
EE-8
JUSPAO

M/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P 2	IO 3
L 3	FBO 3/PM 2	AID 12
3/S 7	G 1	3/P 1
GR	COM 3	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 20	NAVY 5
SD 31	USIA 10	NSA 3
OSD 3	ICA 7	NSC 6

AMB
DEP AMB
POL (5)
JUSPAO (3)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

505 Pol 14 VIET

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-168
NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VIA AIR POUCH FE/VN
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1966 SEP 26 PM 12

Noted

FE/VN

FROM : AmEmbassy SAIGON

DATE: September 22, 1966

Name of Officer WHO

SUBJECT : BACKGROUNDER: Election in Vietnam

REF :

A backgrounder on the election was given September 15 at Mr. Zorthian's residence by Philip Habib, Embassy Political Counselor and Richard W. Teare, Embassy Political Section. Background rules set by Mr. Zorthian were for no attribution to U.S. sources but to "informed sources."

Mr. Habib opened the session to questions immediately. On the possibility of increasing unity among political groups, he said that it was just barely noticeable. However, he emphasized that the Assembly is a true cross section of Vietnamese political life. He said that new groups such as the Movement for Renaissance in the South are not likely to prove as significant as older groups like the VNQDD and the Dai Viet party. He cited youth of elected as sign of new emerging political groups.

Mr. Teare gave a breakdown of groups elected as Assembly members.

By region, there are 27 Northerners, 28 Central Vietnamese, and 44 Southerners. Of the remaining 18, there are eight Chinese, six Montagnards and four Cambodians.

By religion, there are 34 Buddhists, 30 Catholics, 15 Hoa Hao, five Cao Bai, seven Confucians, four Cambodian Theravada Buddhists, and the rest undefined.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FORM DS-323
4-62

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: JUSPAO:RGarrity:ejl

Contents and Classification Approved by: JUSPAO:JStuart:Chief Mission Press Center

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

By occupation there are 22 educators, 23 businessmen, 20 active duty military, 18 civil servants, eight lawyers including judges, seven physicians, seven farmers or landowners, five notables, six retired and the remainder unknown. From the ranks of provincial councils, over 20 were elected.

By political parties there are eight Dai Viets, 10 VNQDD and 10 Renaissance of the South.

By age one half of the Assemblymen are under 45; the average age is 39. There are 15 over 55 years, 29 between 45 and 54 years, 32 between 35 and 44 years, and 36 between 25 and 34 years. Five Assemblymen's ages are unknown.

Mr. Habib said the most important fact of the election is that it completed the first stage of the process of evolutionary political development. The VC suffered a resounding defeat in their failure to block or spoil the election. Dissident groups (Buddhists, Catholics, Struggle, etc.) failed to stimulate any real public reaction against the election. The vote indicates that democracy was and is a political instinct among the Vietnamese. The GVN worked long and hard to get out the vote. There is no evidence of this pressure reaching any extremes or being directed for or against any particular candidates. Mr. Habib said on the basis of extensive reporting, the conclusion must be reached that the election was fair and free. Credit for the success goes to the entire GVN. They made up their minds to have the election and did so. With nearly 500 foreign correspondents observing the proceedings and the presence of many U.S. and foreign observers the GVN had nothing to lose and everything to gain from ensuring an honest election.

The purpose of the election was of course to elect an Assembly to write a Constitution. Although the matter of favorite personalities perhaps outweighed the other issues of the campaign and the type of Constitution candidates might have in mind, Mr. Habib said, the consensus among the elected Assemblymen seems to favor a strong executive branch in the government. An exact breakdown in terms of a presidency and a cabinet with Prime Minister below, as opposed to a parliamentary pattern is not yet discernible. In search of a Constitution, many comparisons will be made especially to Korea and also to countries like Turkey or India. There are many variables, however, in the Vietnamese political equation, he said, and predicted the Assembly will be quite a debating society.

On the future of the military, Mr. Habib said they certainly will be around. The military have shown a capacity for taking on problems and getting things done. An alliance between civilian and military is certainly possible as are military candidates who would more than suffice politically. The Ky government has gained success in many areas although it is not looked at as Ky's success but as shared by all members of the Directorate.

The timetable calls for the Assembly to convene on September 26 and to complete the Constitution within six months. Following approval of the Constitution by the Directorate and the ratification or defeat by a two thirds majority in the Assembly of any Directorate changes, the election of a President and National

Assembly is seen as taking place within three to five months after ratification. It could be as early as next summer or as late as a year from now.

On whether the Constitutent Assembly will vote itself into a Legislature, Mr. Habib had no reading. In any event he pointed out there would probably be another election to choose a president. He felt that there would be advantages in holding another election to further refine the electoral process and stimulate political growth. The atmosphere is good for cooperation between the GVN and the Assembly, although there will be no honeymoon all the way, he said.

On whether the Assembly would be as inclined to Revolutionary Development as the GVN, Mr. Habib thought so. He envisioned no absence of communications between the U.S. and the Assembly while stressing that there was no undue involvement by the U.S. in the election. Future patterns of thought in the Assembly, Mr. Habib said, would run contrary to warlordism and further the evolution of less cautious political activity. The trend towards greater local autonomy is likely.

A final statistic disclosed that invalid ballots accounted for five percent of the total.

LODGE

POL 14 VIETS

DECLASSIFIED (506)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Saigon 6695

R

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Action NNNNVV MJB442JIA817
FE RR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 6695/1 2660855
ZNY CCCCC
Info R 230810Z SEP 66
SS FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
G TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SP INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
SAH RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
L ZEN/AMCONSUL HUE
H RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
SAL STATE GRNC
IO BT
P C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 6695
USIA SEPTEMBER 23
NSC
INR CINCPAC FOR POLAD
CIA
NSA 1. A. LUNCH SEPT 22, FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
OSD TRAN VAN TUYEN (QUAT GOVERNMENT) AND POLITICAL
AID COUNSELOR DISCUSSED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND EVOLVING
POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIET-NAM.

RSR 2. TUYEN WAS IN A BUOYANT MOOD WHICH CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH GLOOMY STATE HE DISPLAYED WHEN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN WAS JUST GETTING UNDERWAY. IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT TUYEN WAS PLEASED WITH WAY ELECTIONS WERE CON-

021037

1966 SEP 23 AM 5 12

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 6695/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUCTED AND THAT HE NOW SEES ASSEMBLY AS OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FUTURE. HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SEVERAL OF THE ASSEMBLYMEN-ELECT AND HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO PLAY A ROLE OF SORTS OUTSIDE THE BODY TO AID IT IN ITS WORK AND TO ORGANIZE FOR THE FUTURE.

(1) 3. TALK TURNED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO THE PRESSING PROBLEMS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO CONFRONT THE ASSEMBLY, VIZ., A FIGHT OVER ARTICLE 20 (THE VETO PROVISION) AND THE CONTEST FOR THE PRESIDENCY. REGARDING THE FIRST OF THESE TUYEN BELIEVES THAT ANY SUCH FIGHT WILL BE SPEARHEADED BY VNQDD ASSEMBLYMEN FROM CENTRAL VIET-NAM. MANY OF THEM HAD CAMPAIGNED AGAINST ARTICLE 20 AND NOW FELT THEY WOULD BE DISLOYAL TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS IF THEY DID NOT EMBARK ON A FLOOR FIGHT OVER ARTICLE 20 IMMEDIATELY

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

AFTER THE ASSEMBLY HAD CONVENED. TUEYN IS INCLINED TO DOWNGRADE THE IMPORTANCE OF ANY SUCH MOVE. A LONGTIME VNQDD OFFICIAL, HE FEELS THAT THIS EFFORT CAN BE CONTAINED AND DISSIPATED WITHOUT TOO MUCH EFFORT, AND IMPLIED HE IS WORKING TOWARD THIS END.

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 6695/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
4. A DEADLOCK OVER THE PRESIDENCY INVOLVING PHAN KHAC SUU; TRAN VAN VAN, AND PHAN QUANG DAN IS VIEWED BY TUYEN AS A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. HE SAYS THAT HE HAS ALREADY TALKED WITH THE THREE PRINCIPALS. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR CURRENT ATTITUDES IN IMPASSE APPEARS LIKELY. TUYEN SAID HE WOULD BE SEEING DAN AND SUU AGAIN ON THE WEEKEND. HE FEELS THAT THE CONTEST BETWEEN VAN AND SUU IS IRRECONCILABLE; BUT HE DOES NOT NOW EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE BETWEEN SUU AND DAN WHICH WOULD GIVE THE FORMER THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LATTER THE INFLUENTIAL POST OF SECRETARY GENERAL. TUYEN IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY PUSH FOR SUCH A SOLUTION. HE FEELS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ASSEMBLY'S PRESIDENT BE A SOUTHERNER.

5. TUYEN SAID THAT HE WOULD BE COLLABORATING WITH DANG VAN SUNG AS THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY GOT DOWN TO ITS WORK. HE NOTED THAT SUNG WAS UNINTERESTED IN PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN THE ASSEMBLY. SUNG IS ATTRACTED BY THE IDEA OF BECOMING MINORITY LEADER.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 6695/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TUYEN SAID THAT HE HAD ARGUED WITH SUNG, CONTENDING THAT THE MINORITY OR OPPOSITION COULD BY CIRCUMSTANCE BE TRANSFORMED INTO A MAJORITY POSITION. HE SAID THAT SUNG UNDERSTOOD THE LOGIC OF THIS ARGUMENT, BUT CONTINUED TO PREFER HIS MINORITY, OPPOSITION ROLE. (TUYEN APPEARS TO SEE A SITUATION DEVELOPING WHEREIN WHAT RESOURCES HE AND SUNG CONTROL MIGHT BE TRANSFORMED INTO A MAJORITY PARTY.)

6. TUYEN WAS ASKED IF HE SAW EVIDENCE OF A GOVERNMENT PARTY DEVELOPING? HE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PRESSED, HE SAID THAT FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANYTHING RESEMBLING THE "KHAKI PARTY" WHICH SO MANY HAD PREDICTED. AMONG THE TWENTY ACTIVE AND RETIRED MILITARY MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE ASSEMBLY, HE SAW NO EVIDENCE OF CENTRAL DIRECTION. MOST, HE FELT, OWED THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO PROVINCE CHIEFS AND CORPS COMMANDERS AND NOT TO EITHER THE DIRECTORATE OR THE GOVERNMENT.

7. TUYEN WAS THEN ASKED ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF SOME GOVERNMENTAL CHANNEL TO THE ASSEMBLY THROUGH

WHICH IDEAS, DRAFTS, INFLUENCE, ETC., COULD BE FUNNELED. AGAIN HE SAID THAT DESPITE HAVING HEARD ALL THE RUMORS THAT SUCH A CHANNEL EXISTED, HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO VERIFY ITS EXISTENCE. HE FEELS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS JUST NOT THAT SUPPLE OR SOPHISTICATED AS YET. HE THINKS THERE MAY BE CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD LIKE TO ESTABLISH SUCH A MECHANISM, BUT SO FAR, DUE EITHER TO LACK OF TALENT OR FINESSE IT HAD NOT BEEN DONE. TRAN VAN DO HAS ALSO SPOKEN TO US OF THE LACK OF CLEAR GOVT. POSITION IN REGARD TO THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY.)

8. THERE WAS MUCH TALK ABOUT POLITICAL POWER RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE FUTURE. TUYEN RAN DOWN THE LIST OF THE GENERALS AND FOUND ONLY NGUYEN VAN THIEU AS AN OFFICER WHO MIGHT HAVE ANY HOPE OR AMBITION OF PLAYING A CIVILIAN POLITICAL ROLE. (HE EXCLUDED KY AS BEING TOO AMBIVALENT IN HIS APPROACH TO POLITICS. AT A LATER STAGE IN THE CONVERSATION HE ADMITTED THAT KY APPEALED TO HIM

BECAUSE HE WAS MORE HONEST THAN THE OTHER GENERALS. HE IMPLIED THAT HE DID NOT FIND THE IDEA OF POLITICAL COLLABORATION WITH KY REPUGNANT.) IN THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION TUYEN RENDERED HIS PERSONAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JUDGMENT THAT ANY PRESIDENT ELECTED UNDER A CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD PERFORCE BE A SOUTHERNER. TICKING OFF THE CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY WHO MIGHT BE LIKELY CANDIDATES, TUYEN DECIDED THAT PERHAPS ONLY TRAN VAN DON (THE RETIRED "DALAT" GENERAL) WOULD BE A SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE. FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER HE DISMISSED ALL THE OTHER CIVILIANS OR MILITARY.

LODGE

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
FE
Info
SS
G
SP
SAH
L
H
SAL
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
AID
RSR

021057

NNNNVV MJA213JIA820
RR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 6695/2 2660910
ZNY CCCCC
R 230810Z SEP 66
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
ZEN/AMCONSUL HUE
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 409
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 6695

1966 SEP 23
AM 5 35

SEPTEMBER 23

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

9. TUYEN WAS THEN BROUGHT BACK TO THE SUBJECT HE HAD RAISED AT THE CONVERSATION'S OUTSET: HIS OWN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE CONTACTING A VARIETY OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORGE A POLITICAL BLOC. HE ADMITTED THAT HE, DAN AND SUNG WERE INTERESTED IN FORGING A PEASANT-WORKER PARTY. TRAN QUOC BUU OF THE CVT HAD

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 6695/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BEEN CONSULTED AND PARTIALLY RECRUITED, BUT THEY HAD NOT LIMITED THEIR EFFORTS TO THE CVT AND BUU; THEY WERE ALSO WORKING WITH OTHER CANDIDATES AND EXPECTED TO COLLABORATE WITHBUI LUONG, BUU'S LONGTIME NEMESIS. (TUYEN DIGRESSED AT THIS POINT TO REGRET THE FACT THAT LUONG AND BUU WERE NO LONGER TOGETHER OR EVEN ON SPEAKING TERMS; HE FEELS THEY COULD ONCE MORE BE BROUGHT TOGETHER.)

10. TUYEN WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THEIR EFFORTS TO RALLY VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE VIETNAMESE BODY-POLITIC. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS HIS STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CATHOLIC FACTIONS AS DISPARATE AS FATHER HOANG QUYNH AND THE LEFT-WING SONG DAO GROUP (HE MENTIONED NGUYEN VAN TRUNG

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

AND LY CHANH TRUNG) WHOSE MEMBERS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS NEUTRALIST AND PRO-FRENCH. HE ALSO SAID HE HAD BEEN IN RECENT POLITICAL CONTACT WITH THICH PHAP TRI, BUT HIS OWN INCLINATION IS TO WRITE OFF THE BUDDHIST

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 6695/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INSTITUTE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE LEADERSHIP SHOWS ITSELF CAPABLE OF SORTING OUT INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION.

11. COMMENT: IT IS OBVIOUS THAT TUYEN FEELS THAT HE WILL HAVE ENOUGH INFLUENCE WITHIN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SO AS TO BE ABLE TO EXERCISE SOME CONTROL OVER ITS FINAL PRODUCT. AT THIS POINT HIS THOUGHTS ARE GENERALLY MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. HE REFERRED DURING THE CONVERSATION TO SUNG'S IDEA OF A SEMINAR OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY UNDER THE AUSPICES OF CHINH LUAN. (SUNG'S DAILY NEWSPAPER.) TUYEN EXPECTS TO BE ONE OF THE LEGAL EXPERTS CALLED UPON TO ADDRESS THE ASSEMPLYMEN WHO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SEMINAR. HE ALSO MADE A POINT OF THE FACT THAT SEVERAL OF HIS READERS HAD ASKED THAT HIS RECENT ARTICLES ON GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONS WHICH HAD APPEARED IN CHINH LUAN BE PRESERVED IN BOOK OGD.

TUYEN IS UNDOUBTEDLY ONE OF THE BEST LEGAL BRAINS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. HE IS A NORTHERNER BY BIRTH, SERVED AS MINISTER OF INFORMATION IN ONE OF THE

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 6695/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FRENCH-SPONSORED GOVERNMENTS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WAS A MEMBER OF THE GENEVA DELEGATION IN 1954, IS THE FRIEND OR ACQUAINTANCE OF EVERY POLITITIAN OF ANY IMPORTANCE CURRENTLY ON THE SCENE. BARRING SOME EXTRAORDINARY TURN OF FATE, TUYEN WILL BE A POLITICAL FACT OF LIFE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM FOR SOME TIME TO COME. HOWEVER, HIS CONFIDENT ASSERTIONS OF ABILITY TO BRING TOGETHER VARIOUS FACTIONAL ELEMENTS IN AND OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY ARE PROBABLY OVERSTATED FOR OUR BENEFIT.

LODGE
BT